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Abstract 
 The digital domain is the emerging environment for which the internet and data 
connectivity exists. This new domain is challenging the traditional place for geopolitics to exist, 
and creating new challenges to international relations. The use of cyberweapons through direct 
cyberattacks, such as the possibility of an attack on the U.S. power grid, or misinformation 
campaigns, such as the one launched by Russia against the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, can 
expand the international threat landscape. While these new threats increase, states are widely not 
prepared to address the new challenges in the digital domain. This paper will use three primary 
sources and a variety of secondary sources to analyze the aspects of cyberwarfare, how to 
effectively secure nations against threats from the digital domain, and how developing versus 
developed countries react differently to advances in technology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Dr. Csurgai for being an instrumental part in the creation and development 
of this paper. Additionally, thank you to Aline and Christine for your help in making my time in 
Switzerland so impactful.   
 
Thank you to the wonderful 26 other students in the SIT International Studies and Multilateral 
Diplomacy program. Even though our time in Switzerland was cut short, thank you for the 
constant support and friendship throughout our two months. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Table of Contents 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….5 
Defining Geopolitics and its Historical Space……………………………………………………9 
Actors and Aspects of Cyberwarfare 
 Non-State Actors…………………………………………………………………………11 
 State Actors………………………………………………………………………………11 
 How the U.S. Power Grid Represents Vulnerabilities in the Digital Domain…………...13 
 Misinformation Attacks………………………………………………………………….16 
Security……………………………………………………………………………….………….18 
Challenges in Cybersecurity…………………………………………..…………………18 
Case Study—European Union and Cybersecurity Challenges…………………………..18 
Economics………………………………………………………………………………………..20 
 The Cost of Cybercrime………………………………………………………………….20 
 The Digital Divide……………………………………………………………………….21 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….23 
 The Future of Cyberspace………………………………………………………………..23 
Abbreviation List………………………………………………………………………………...24 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..25 
Work Journal…………………………………………………………………………………….28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Introduction 
Why it’s Important to Study Cyberspace in the context of geopolitics 
 While geopolitics has been advancing and tackling new challenges for centuries, the 
development of a cyber domain is creating a new space for geopolitics to exist. The cyber 
domain in the context of geopolitics refers to the use of the internet or digital operations in 
achieving one’s political agenda. While many security and diplomatic experts address the need 
for digital strategies in combating disinformation and cyberweapon campaigns, there is little 
discussion on how this domain will shift the area of geopolitics. It is necessary to look at the 
totality of what geopolitics encompasses, from economic means to security, in order to better 
understand how the cyber domain will expand international relationships.  
While during our time in Switzerland we studied a variety of geopolitical issues such as 
migration, terrorism, economic security, etc, there was only one lecture on the digital domain and 
it focused on the diplomatic side of international studies. I want to focus my research project on 
how geopolitics is shifting due to the increase in cyberweapons and how this will impact spaces 
in geopolitics. I expect my paper to highlight how much of the world is unprepared to address 
cyberweapons and their impact on geopolitics.  
 
The Focus of the Study 
 While it is important to cover all relevant material relating to the geopolitical sphere of 
the digital domain, I will be touching on the following aspects to keep my study brief. First, there 
will be a discussion of the definition of geopolitics and how cyber weapons are challenging this 
definition. Next, it is necessary to define what are the most threatening cyber-attacks to 
international security with a case study on the U.S. power grid. Following that there will be a 
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section on who are the actors participating in the digital domain. After, there will be an analysis 
of the cybersecurity aspects of this new space and how the European Union is creating 
incohesive cybersecurity policies. Next, a discussion on the economics of the digital domain will 
be presented to reveal how developing and developed countries are impacted differently by this 
space. Finally, the paper will end with insight on what the future for the digital domain will look 
like, specifically focusing on recommendations for securing the cyber sphere. Overall, this paper 
will answer how the space for geopolitics is being impacted by the digital domain and it will 
provide recommendations for how to handle this new space in international relations.  
 
Literature Review 
The literature surrounding the digital domain and geopolitics often is limited in its scope 
of focus. While there are a variety of publications available, a large portion does not specifically 
mention geopolitics. Additionally, most of the literature available focuses strictly on one aspect 
of the digital domain, such as economics, security, or the type of warfare used. There is a little 
amount of literature that looks at the digital domain from a holistic stance, considering the wide 
array of aspects impacting cyber space.  
However, a large number of publications on the digital domain and geopolitics come 
from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Technology Policy Program, 
International Security Program, and Strategic Foresight Group. The most important recent CSIS 
pieces of literature that relate to my ISP topic include Cyber Solarium and the Sunset of 
Cybersecurity, Economic Impact of Cybercrime, Russia’s Attacks On Democratic Justice 
Systems, and Has Europe Lost Both the Battle and War over Its Digital Future? These reports 
use a data-driven approach to understanding the issues facing the digital domain today.  
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In addition to CSIS, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Israeli-based 
think tank has a “Cyber, Intelligence, and Security” program that highlights new developments 
in cyberspace. The INSS Cyber, Intelligence, and Security releases a report every month about 
the most relevant developments impacting cyberwarfare, with the most recent addition being The 
Secret War of Cyber Influence Operations and How to Identify Them. These reports look past the 
case by case basis of cyber conflicts and look to compare traditional means of military tactics to 
cyberwarfare.  
Relevant literature surrounding this topic also includes reports released by governments 
on the issue of cybersecurity. Specifically, the White House released a report entitled, The Cost 
of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy. This report highlights the risks of a cyber-
attack to the United States, while also describing the United States’ policies surrounding 
cybersecurity. 
The theoretical approach in this study will compare historical geopolitical spaces to 
modern cyberwarfare. In addition to defining geopolitics and how historically it has been used, 
the project will address the new issues that arise with the advancement of technology. In general, 
the study aims to address how technology and cyberweapons are shifting the space of 
geopolitics. While wars have been fought in a variety of spaces—air, land, and sea—the cyber 
domain creates another space for geopolitics with new problems to address.  
 
Research Methodology 
This research project includes both primary and secondary sources to help develop an 
analysis of how the digital domain is shifting geopolitics. The primary sources utilized include 
three different interviews with experts based in Europe. One of these interviews was conducted 
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in person in Brussels, Belgium and the other two were accomplish through phone calls due to the 
coronavirus pandemic. These experts come from a variety of backgrounds including experience 
with artificial intelligence, European Union cybersecurity policies, digital diplomacy, 
cyberwarfare, misinformation campaigns, and general knowledge of how geopolitics are being 
impacted by cyber tools. In addition to the primary sources, there is also the use of secondary 
sources to complement the primary sources used. To draw from the best and more accurate 
sources, the University of Michigan library database that allows students access to thousands of 
scholarly articles online was referenced. Since the paper includes three expert interviews, there 
was also a consultation with the CYBERSEC Forum that happened in March of 2020. While this 
conference was supposed to be in person, a digital version was produced and published to 
YouTube. The paper references this conference in a variety of sections to gain a better 
perspective of European approaches to cybersecurity strategies.  
The study primarily used qualitative analysis methods to analyze the primary and 
secondary sources presented in the development of the research question. The largest aspects of 
qualitative analysis that were used include interviews and content analysis to better understand 
relevant narratives around the topic. While the majority of the paper was done through 
qualitative analysis, there was a significant amount of secondary quantitative analysis tools. For 
example, Gallup polls and statistical modeling was presenting as a way to support arguments, but 
the analysis was done by a secondary source.  
In terms of the ethical considerations of this study, there were a variety of considerations 
necessary to align with the guidelines of the School for International Training (SIT). First, 
throughout the expert interviews, an acknowledgment of the rights of the subjects was necessary 
to address and a clear path for open communication was established. Additionally, in presenting 
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and processing relevant data to the study, acknowledging and accurate presentation of sources 
was necessary. Finally, before beginning the study, an application to the SIT ethical review 
board was completed regarding the use of human subjects. 
 
Definitions and the Analytical/Theoretical Framework 
 There are a variety of terms that can be used to describe how the internet and digital 
connectedness of the globe is impacting geopolitics. While many of the terms refer to similar 
concepts or items, there are some differences that should be noted prior to reading the analysis 
section of this paper. The digital domain refers to the internet, connection of cyber tools, and any 
software that exists in the cloud. Often, when using the phrase digital domain, it refers to the new 
sphere created for geopolitics to exist with the advancement of technology. Cybersecurity is the 
aspect of protecting the digital domain from adversaries. Cyber weapons are any cyber tools that 
have been created to cause disruption or harm to an actor. Cyber space is similar to the digital 
domain in referring to the sphere created by technological development. Geoeconomics is the 
economic trends of countries and how they relate to other nations. Finally, cyber warfare is how 
states and non-state actors utilize cyber tools to cause destruction.  
 
Defining Geopolitics and its Historical Space 
Historically, geopolitics has been defined as “the interactions between political processes 
and geographic spaces, not as a separate social science but as an interdisciplinary method of 
analysis” (Csurgai 2019). The most important aspect of this definition is the aspect of 
“geographic spaces”, representing the traditional means of geopolitics occurring in physical 
spaces such as land, air, and sea. The tangible aspects of geopolitics such as natural resources, 
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geographical configuration, and the geography of populations have historically contributed to the 
relationship between geopolitics and space. One of the most important developments of the early 
21st century was the rapid commercialization of air space. From 1970 to 2001, airline passengers 
increased by 1.345 billion passengers carried every year (Air transport, passengers carried 2001). 
The commercialization of the air domain for geopolitics advanced swiftly, allowing the space to 
be a target for actors to achieve political goals. This was mostly seen in the events of 9/11, where 
a terrorist organization utilized this new space in geopolitics. In comparison, a similar but larger 
development in the space of geopolitics today is occurring with the creation of a cyber domain. 
The cyber domain is adding a new space for geopolitics to exist, creating a relationship 
between political processes and the digital sphere. Over 4.39 billion people are currently online, 
which demonstrates a rapid increase in users from the creation of the world wide web in 1990. 
However, it is not just users on the internet, digital tools are now a part of every part of modern 
society. This new space creates a variety of new developments for geopolitics, ranging from 
security implications to economic incentives. In general, the cyber domain does not solve or 
delay current geopolitical conflicts, but rather “the Internet seems to multiply and complicate 
them” (Douzet 2014). Due to the creation of this new domain in which geopolitics exists, it is 
necessary to examine the impact cyber will have on the future of international relations.  
 While the cyber domain is impacting geopolitics in a variety of ways, it is important to 
understand it is the means of international relations, not the underlying interests that are being 
impacted. James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights 
this impact in noting that “despite the digital revolution, the strategic interests and objectives of 
states remain unchanged for the time being” (Douzet 2014). With the advancement of the 
internet and cyber tools, the means of geopolitics is shifting, but the motivating factors of nation-
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states remain the same. The new means of geopolitics that the cyber domain has created have led 
to a significant amount of new threats to international security, including cyberweapons, 
misinformation campaigns, and economic warfare. These threats will be addressed in future 
sections, specifically how actors and countries are responding to the shift of geopolitics in 
cyberspace.  
 
Actors and Aspects of Cyberwarfare 
Non-State Actors  
 There is an increased amount of actors now participating in the digital domain and while 
the realities of cyberwar are seen more as a future than an immediate threat, “one of the most 
remarkable elements of past cyber events is the substantial involvement of non-state actors” 
(Bussolati 2015). For these groups, the digital domain became a place to spread their political 
ideologies and utilize “digital weapons—cheap, powerful, and easy to use, to obtain, or to 
manufacture” (Bussolati 2015). A variety of non-state actors are able to use the digital domain to 
achieve their objectives, including individual hackers, criminal organizations, cyber mercenaries, 
or hacktivists (Bussolati 2015). Some of the largest successful hacks, such as the 2007 Estonian 
denial of service attack, have been committed by non-state hacking groups (Bussolati 2015). 
These groups have increasingly turned to digital tools to achieve their objectives due to the 
anonymity of cyberweapons and ease of access to these resources. A recent study estimates that a 
low-end cyberattack that costs just $34/month could return $25,000 a month to the hacker 
(Friedman 2016). In addition, these low-cost cyberattacks can advance the political agenda of a 
non-state actor in a variety of ways. While there are many ways non-state actors are utilizing the 
digital domain, some barriers exist to full access to cyber tools by these groups. 
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State Actors  
 In comparison to non-state actors, state actors are taking a different approach to utilize 
cyber tools in the digital domain. There are three areas that states are focusing on to tackle 
threats in the digital domain—public/private partnerships, collaborations across states, and 
understanding the diversity of threats—however, there are many areas for states to improve in 
these categories. 
First, since the digital domain relies so heavily on private companies creating new 
advancements, states will be at the forefront of technological development if there is a focus on 
public-private partnerships (Duberry 2020). If states are able to collaborate with private 
companies to lead the advancements occurring in the digital domain, they will always have the 
advantage over non-state actors of utilizing these resources first and developing security 
measures to protect against these advancements. However, there is little cooperation existing 
between the public and private sectors for a variety of reasons (Increasing International 
Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms 2018). Primarily, the lack of an 
information-sharing platform between the public and private sectors creates disparities in 
technological development between states and companies (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity 
to the U.S. Economy). Additionally, states struggled with sharing information about their cyber 
strategies to the public, out of fear adversaries will use it to their advantage. It was not until the 
Trump administration took office in 2017 that the United States publicly displayed the pillars of 
their cybersecurity strategy (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy). This 
lack of transparency made it more difficult for private companies to work with the public sector 
in advancing the cybersecurity capabilities of the federal government. 
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Next, as non-state actors act alone in separate groups with little collaboration, states are 
creating partnerships to ensure protection against cyberweapons. Global cyberattacks, such as the 
WannaCry ransomware attack of 2017 on civilians that locked people out of their devices until a 
sum is paid to the hacker, created the understanding that international cooperation is necessary to 
fight these non-state actors (Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting 
Cyber Norms 2018). Not only do global attacks allow countries to understand the security threat 
cyberattacks create to their citizens, but the WannaCry attack cost over $1 billion dollars and 
demonstrated the economic impact non-state actors can have using cyberweapons (Increasing 
International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms 2018). Legislation across 
the European Union has been enacted to create uniformity in cybersecurity policies, but there are 
still significant gaps in these regulations that expose states to cyberattacks (Fantin 2020). There 
will be a significant discussion on the lack of uniformity in the EU cybersecurity policy later in 
the paper. 
Finally, there is some concern about the diverse amount of security threats that are 
created in the cyber domain and the ability of states to be prepared to face these threats. While 
other spaces for geopolitics to exist have widely remained constant in their threats, the digital 
domain is developing more rapidly than ever seen before (Duberry 2020). Instead of being 
natural-born like air, land, and sea, the digital domain is man-made, allowing people to have the 
power to change and advance it (Duberry 2020). One of the more recent threats that the digital 
domain has produced is the advancement of misinformation campaigns being spread on social 
media. Cognitive warfare such as these misinformation campaigns is having a large impact on 
geopolitics and international relations as a whole. 
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How the U.S. Power Grid Represents Vulnerabilities in the Digital Domain 
In addition to cyberspace transforming the geopolitical landscape, the cyber weapons 
used now create new threats to international security. Not only is the cyber domain shifting how 
we understand international relations and expanding our understanding of geopolitical spaces, 
but the development of digital weapons creates more advanced threats to our civilizations. One 
of the largest concerns is the “protection of vital infrastructures, which if disrupted or sabotaged 
could endanger civilian populations” (Douzet 2014). In a highly digitized society where basic 
security requirements and natural resources rely on the cyber domain, there is an increased 
geopolitical threat to citizens (Dincic 2020). The largest example of a vulnerable aspect of 
infrastructure includes the digitalization of the power grid across the globe, more specifically the 
United States’ power grid is especially vulnerable to an attack by an adversary.  
Specific vulnerabilities in the U.S. power grid system demonstrate how hackers could 
gain access and control over the North American power grid. The power grid is initially designed 
to protect itself from natural disasters or cyber-attacks because it is broken up into 4 sections 
across North America. However, if adversaries can take offline 9 substations out of the 55,000 in 
the United States, the U.S. could suffer coast to coast blackouts lasting 18 months or more (U.S. 
Risks National Blackout From Small-Scale Attack 2014).  In March 2019, a cyber-attack on 
critical power centers demonstrated the specifics of how an attack can harm U.S. infrastructure.  
The cyber-attack in March 2019 attacked parts of the power grid in California, Wyoming, 
and Utah using a vulnerability in the network’s firewall (Report reveals play-by-play of first U.S. 
grid cyberattack 2019).  The utility’s firewall censored data flow from the grid’s generator sites 
to the utility’s control center. The hacker utilized this vulnerability to reboot the firewall over 
and over, eventually breaking the software and making operators lose contact with the generator 
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sites and the control center.  These glitches lasted for around 10 hours, but power was never lost 
to any of the power grid sections (Report reveals play-by-play of first U.S. grid cyberattack 
2019). There is evidence that the attacker was most likely using an automated bot to scan the 
internet for vulnerable devices and did not know it had infiltrated the utility’s network.  
Future attacks could happen similarly to the cyber-attack that occurred in March 2019, 
but there are also other ways an adversary could infiltrate the North American Power Grid (The 
Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018). According to the White House, 
adversaries could target laptops of key personnel with access to multiple power plants, physically 
enter locations that monitor the power grid network, or hack a remotely accessed control system.  
Additionally, the White House fears phishing attacks against the power grid’s corporate network 
to infiltrate the system and then use a pivoting attack to ultimately access the control system (The 
Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018).  All these methods expose 
vulnerabilities to the North American Power Grid that could allow adversaries to cripple the U.S. 
and have major impacts on Americans. 
An attack on the North American Power Grid could have large effects on the U.S. 
economy, health and human rights of U.S. citizens, and threaten national security. First, the 
economic impacts can be seen through the largest power outage in U.S. history in 2003 that 
impacted the Midwest, Northeast, and parts of Canada. This outage was because of a human 
programming error with indirect and direct damages costing a total of $6 billion (Emerging Risk 
Series, Business Blackout 2015).  Recent estimates project that a cyber-attack on critical U.S. 
infrastructure could cause economic damages up to $1 trillion (Emerging Risk Series, Business 
Blackout 2015). In addition to economic implications, a cyber-attack could cause health and 
safety concerns for U.S. citizens. A power outage would impact heating and cooling for homes 
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and food supplies, limit the supply of clean water without power for the treatment pumps, and 
create a fuel shortage in hospital generators (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. 
Economy 2018).  All of these implications could cause severe illness and death in the U.S. 
Finally, 85% of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) energy comes from commercial services and 
a power outage would greatly impact the defense of the United States (The Cost of Malicious 
Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018).  The DoD would be unable to perform routine 
protections against adversaries to secure the U.S. The impact of a cyber-attack to the North 
American Power Grid would have severe financial, humanitarian, and national security 
implications on the United States.  
 
Misinformation Attacks 
 The rapid expansion of social media has led to a new geopolitical threat to states across 
the globe. As of January 2020, there were over 3.8 billion social media users across the world 
(Digital in 2020). This new platform has connected the world in incredible ways, from fueling 
the Arab Spring to giving people in underdeveloped countries access to the internet. However, 
with the rise of social media, there is also a rise in geopolitical threats that face societies. Across 
the globe “many countries use cyberspace, and specifically social media, to manage cyber 
influence operations as part of holistic information warfare” (Tayouri 2020). These 
misinformation campaigns serve a variety of purposes and they are not the first time influence 
operations have been utilized in warfare, “a close term to cyber influence in the military context 
is influencing maneuver, which is the process of using operations to get inside an enemy’s 
decision cycle or even forcing that decision cycle to direct or indirect actions” (Tayouri 2020). 
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While these types of operations have appeared in military tactics before, misinformation 
campaigns in the digital domain create a vast array of new threats to geopolitics.  
 The most prominent and impactful use of misinformation spread on social media came 
from Russian forces beginning in 2014 all the way up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. 
Specifically, the hackers deployed “social media trolls and bots to spread online content that 
undermines faith in democracies and their institutions” (Spalding 2019). This campaign had a 
large impact on civil society with approximately 126 million people being reached through 
Russian posts on Facebook during the 2016 presidential election (Spalding 2019). These posts 
were not simply in support of one candidate over another for President of the United States, 
Russia was pursuing “an attack on public trust and confidence” and questioning the functionality 
of western democratic institutions (Spalding 2019). This misinformation was meant to target 
certain populations in the United States such as African-Americans, immigrants, far-right 
activists, and liberal thinkers. The main goal of targeting these groups was “to amplify an 
existing divide within the American public” (Spalding 2019) and create distrust in democratic 
institutions. An important impact of this misinformation campaign was that it allowed the United 
States to understand the critical role elections play in the country. Following the discovery of 
Russian interference in the 2016 election, the Obama administration designated the election 
infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector in the United States (Johnson 2017). By 
drawing larger attention to the election infrastructure, this designation is vital to protecting the 
United States’ election against misinformation in the future.  
 These types of misinformation campaigns are impactful for a variety of reasons, but two 
being the mistrust in America’s media and the use of social media as a means of receiving the 
news. In 2018, only 21% of Republicans stated they had “a great deal” or even “a fair amount” 
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of trust in America’s media (Jones 2018). This demonstrates the ability for right-wing citizens in 
the U.S. to not believe the mainstream media and become more likely to trust misinformation 
campaigns on social media. In addition to the mistrust in America’s media, a large amount of 
Americans are receiving their news on social media platforms. In 2018, around 68% of 
Americans said they have used social media in some form to receive news (News Use Across 
Social Media Platforms 2018). This shift in using online platforms to receive news about the 
world is allowing misinformation to spread more easily and reach a larger array of people. 
Overall, misinformation campaigns create a large threat to geopolitics and relations between 
states, especially with the increased use of social media platforms.   
 
Security 
Challenges in Cybersecurity  
One of the most important aspects of the digital domain is creating comprehensive 
cybersecurity policies to protect against cyber weapons. Compare to previous spaces in 
geopolitics, such as air, land, and sea, the digital domain creates more challenges in security. 
Governments across the globe are rapidly increasing security efforts to account for the threats in 
this shifting domain. Specifically, the United States increased funding by $800 billion for cyber 
defense in 2013 and the US Cyber Command will see an increase from 900 to 4,900 employees 
in the coming years (Douzet 2014). This rapid expansion and investment in cybersecurity 
demonstrate the increased risks to nations from cyberweapons. However, with a new domain 
being developed for geopolitics to exist in, there is also an increasing amount of issues with 
cybersecurity regulations.  
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Case Study—European Union and Cybersecurity Challenges  
 With recent developments in technology, cybersecurity is an important aspect of 
protecting societies against the harmful weapons in the digital domain. Since the cyber domain is 
a relatively unexplored territory for legislation, there is an opportunity to develop a sustainable 
framework for uniform cybersecurity regulations across countries. However, international 
organizations such as the European Union (EU) have struggled to create cohesive cybersecurity 
policies across their member-states for a variety of reasons (Fantin 2020).  
 First, many member-states in the EU see cybersecurity as impacting domestic policy and 
thus infringing on the sovereignty of the states (Fantin 2020). According to the United States, 
there are 16 critical sectors that will be impacted by cybersecurity regulations (Critical 
Infrastructure Sectors 2020). These sectors include a wide range of industries ranging from 
energy, to finance, to food and agriculture (Critical Infrastructure Sectors 2020). The diverse 
range of industries that are impacted by cybersecurity demonstrates how issues can arise in 
regulating a variety of sectors. There is then a repeat of a very common question within the EU, 
how can you protect the sovereignty of states while advancing security? This digital and political 
clash will continue to create issues in creating cohesive strategies for cybersecurity in the EU. 
 Additionally, similar to the United States, EU member-states are struggling to share 
cybersecurity strategies. Specifically, “given the sensitive nature of the technology, the sharing 
of capacities is perceived as giving up sovereignty and what it can reveal about strengths and 
weaknesses” (Douzet 2014). Not only is there a lack of transparency within the EU, but there are 
also significant disparities in the cyber tools developed by member-states. Throughout the EU, 
many experts have found “disparities in capabilities are very wide” with nations that have the 
“most advanced capabilities view them as an area of national sovereignty and give priority to 
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cultivating bilateral arrangements” (Douzet 2014). In order to improve cybersecurity policies, the 
EU must follow the transparency of the United States in sharing its security policy.  
 Finally, there is a race for artificial intelligence across Europe which impacts the ability 
to create a cohesive cybersecurity strategy (Fantin 2020). There is a general sentiment that if you 
can be the first nation to master artificial intelligence, then you will dominate the geopolitical 
rise of this new technology (Fantin 2020). New developments in artificial intelligence will serve 
to shape political processes and relationships among powers (Technology Alliances Response to 
Geopolitical Tensions 2020). However, the competitive nature of artificial intelligence makes the 
EU member-states less inclined to regulate this market (Technology Alliances Response to 
Geopolitical Tensions 2020). Since European countries are not only in competition with each 
other but also are in competition with nations across the globe such as the United States and 
China, fewer governments are concerned with the security aspects of this technology and are 
more concerned with developing at a fast pace.  
 
Economics 
The Cost of Cybercrime 
 The digital domain is not only having an impact on the security of nation-states, but there 
are significant economic implications of cybercrime. In 2014, it was estimated that $445 billion 
was lost every year to cybercrime (Lewis 2018). By 2018, that number jumped to $600 billion, 
nearly one percent of global GDP (Lewis 2018). While hacking in a relatively cheap way to 
attack an adversary, costing as little as less than $100, there is often a large economic return. The 
financial gains from hacking generally come from the monetization of digital data, or creating 
ransomware attacks that ensure users will pay to retrieve their stolen data (Lewis 2018).  
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Specifically, the countries most impacted by cybercrime are the nations with higher a GDP or 
more advanced technological development, reflecting that “the richer the country, the greater its 
loss to cybercrime is likely to be” (Lewis 2018). Due to a larger amount of technological 
development, these nations are a larger target for cybercrime and consequently pay a larger price. 
In addition to the economic burden the digital domain creates for more developed countries, 
there are also differences in access to cyber tools between nations across the globe. 
 
The Digital Divide 
 Since the rapid development of the digital domain, the creation of a digital divide has 
been introduced to nations. The digital divide represents how countries with varying economic 
resources are impacted differently to advancements in the digital domain. With a low barrier to 
entry and relatively low cost of resources, the digital domain shows some promise of allowing 
developing countries to participate in the technological rise (Dincic 2020). Specifically, the 
digital economy is able to include a variety of nations “by lowering transaction costs, addressing 
information asymmetries and exploiting economies of scale and network effects” (Dahlman, 
Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). There are a variety of platforms and digital tools that are aiding 
the connectedness of developing countries to the digital domain, with one example being 
Ushahidi. 
Ushahidi is an African software platform that looks to help victims in global 
emergencies. This platform is using technology to collect information at a high speed from the 
grassroots of African countries (Dincic 2020). The technology was originally developed in 2008 
in Kenya following an increase in post-election violence to locate safe-havens for citizens 
(Ushahidi: The African Software Platform Helping Victims in Global Emergencies 2013). 
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However, the platform has expanded significantly to the Middle East and Asia to crowdsource 
information on violence and natural disasters (Ushahidi: The African Software Platform Helping 
Victims in Global Emergencies 2013). Ushahidi is a relevant example of how the developing 
world can utilize technology to advance the countries’ connectedness and streamline effective 
communication. 
There are also some challenges presenting in the engagement of the digital domain with 
developing countries. The digital divide can refer to the fact that many of the technological 
advancements occurring in developed countries “depend on a basic level of infrastructure that 
many emerging economies still lack” (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). It is estimated 
that “approximately two thirds of the world’s population does not have access to the Internet. 
These 4.3 billion people generally live in rural, geographically dispersed areas” (Dahlman, 
Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). Access to the internet is the more basic form of infrastructure 
needed to participate in the digital domain, but the majority of the world lacks internet 
connectivity. Even if developing countries are able to obtain this basic infrastructure, there will 
be a delay in their ability to implement these new technologies. This delay will allow developed 
countries to create the regulatory structure and form the digital frameworks for the globe, putting 
developing countries at a disadvantage (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). For this 
reason, it is recommended that developing countries “engage in strategic planning to maximise 
the development impact of digitalization” (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). If the 
developing world is to gain significantly from the digital domain, there needs to be a 
collaboration with the developed economies to ensure digital frameworks reflect the needs of all 
nations.  
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There are also some challenges for the developed world to engage with the digital 
domain. Specifically, in many OECD countries, there is significant growth in a select amount of 
large companies at the expense of smaller ones (Dincic 2020). These companies are creating 
monopolies on the technology market, especially with the increase in company mergers and 
buyouts that consolidate parts of the tech industry (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). 
Since these companies hold a significant share of the market concerning technological 
advancements, they have the ability to restrict government involvement in the development of 
the digital domain. However, there is hope for a public-private partnership in the United States 
with the expansion of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). This 
institution serves “as a facilitator of knowledge-sharing and coordinator of research activities 
undertaken by various parties” which allows the federal government to promote advancement in 
developing technologies and encourage competition in the private sector (Dahlman, Mealy, and 
Wermelinger 2016). In funding initiatives such as DARPA, countries are able to decrease the 
hold large technology companies may have on the advancement of the digital domain.  
 
Conclusion 
The Future of Cyberwarfare  
The digital domain is having a significant impact on geopolitics, specifically focusing on 
international security and geoeconomics. The vast amount of technological advances is creating 
new areas for adversaries to act, specifically exposing vulnerabilities in the digitization of energy 
and social media is allowing state and non-state actors to pursue misinformation campaigns. The 
example of the United States’ power grid demonstrates how increasing digital tools in a 
country’s infrastructure can leave states exposed to large cyber-attacks. Additionally, 
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misinformation campaigns can weaken public confidence in federal institutions and create 
divisions between state populations. There are also large disparities in how nations are 
addressing the geoeconomic implications of the digital domain. In cyberspace, developing and 
developed countries are experiencing vast differences in access to digital tools and this could 
lead to gaps in who is positively impacted by the digital domain.  
Overall, there are a variety of questions that remain unanswered with how nations will 
address the increasing geopolitical threat of the digital domain. Specifically, since the cyber 
domain is man-made unlike past spaces for geopolitics to exist, it is constantly changing and 
advancing. Without public-private partnerships between states and companies, federal 
governments and international organizations are not prepared to understand the rapid 
developments produced in the digital domain. Additionally, there are large gaps in securing the 
digital domain which could lead to vulnerabilities in international security. Countries need to 
create cohesive and collaborative cybersecurity regulation in order to combat the adversaries 
attempting to pursue cybercrimes. While the digital domain is advancing at a historic speed, 
nation-states may not be ready for the implications of cyberspace on geopolitics. The world is 
seeing a revolutionary shift in geopolitics and the “beginning of a growing period of dominance 
of cyberspace in international relations”, but governments across the globe often lack the tools to 
effectively regulate this new domain (Popa 2014). 
 
Abbreviation List 
SIT=School for International Training 
EU=European Union 
U.S.=United States 
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DARPA= Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
OECD=Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
CSIS=Center for Strategic and International Studies 
DoD=Department of Defense 
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